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TRIBUTE 
 
DAVID TRAGER: JURIST 
Jeffrey Brandon Morris† 
Earlier this year, the federal judiciary and the City of 
New York lost an able judge and one of the city’s most public-
spirited citizens. As a former United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of New York, Judge David G. Trager took over 
what historically had been a patronage-driven office and 
transformed it into one that is highly professional and motivated 
to strike political corruption.1 As dean of Brooklyn Law School 
for over a decade, Trager was the central figure in transforming 
that institution from a local to national law school.2 
While I have written elsewhere about the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, as well as 
its judges, I cannot pretend to be completely objective in this 
essay, although I have attempted to be. I was a Visiting 
Professor at Brooklyn Law School during David Trager’s 
deanship, and he left an indelible imprint on my career as a 
teacher and scholar. As dean, David Trager was a memorable 
personality. Large in size, he dominated any room he walked 
into by the strength of his personality. He propelled Brooklyn 
Law School forward with his vision—and with his ability to take 
the law school in new directions by anticipating and overcoming 
opposition through negotiation. In the end, much of his success 
can be attributed to the fact that he was able to persuade others 
that his motivation was truly not personal aggrandizement, but 
rather the improvement of the institution.3 
  
 † Professor of Law, Touro Law School. 
 1 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 2 JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 151-69 (2001). 
 3 Id. 
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When he was dean, David Trager, often without being 
asked, was of enormous assistance to the careers of others. 
When the recipient of such gratuitous assistance attempted to 
express his or her appreciation, it tended to be received with 
what can only be described as an “embarrassed growl.” 
The demands upon a federal district judge are very 
different from those of a dean. While far too early to attempt a 
definitive assessment of Trager’s seventeen-year career from 
1993 to 2011 as a district judge, one could at this point make a 
few observations about his work. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
that Trager joined in 1994 was already a distinguished court. 
Although it had lost men of John F. Dooling, Jr., and Orrin G. 
Judd’s quality, the court already included judges of superb 
caliber—Jacob Mishler, Jack B. Weinstein, and Eugene 
Nickerson, to name but a few. The jurisdiction of the district 
provided a rich docket: drug arrests were made at its airports; 
notorious organized crimes were committed within its five 
counties; lawsuits were frequently launched against its 
government; and complex commercial disputes were spawned 
in its boroughs. The government of the City of New York was 
an obvious target for lawsuits. Environmental actions in 
Nassau and Suffolk Counties, and copyright, trademark, and 
civil rights litigation were common.4 Trager had his share of 
these cases and much else. 
I. TRAGER AND THE “CLASSIC” FEDERAL SPECIALTIES 
The old specialties of the federal courts were well 
represented on the Eastern District’s docket and on Trager’s. 
Among those specialties were admiralty, bankruptcy, and 
criminal cases. Judge Trager had no “blockbuster” cases in these 
areas, but a brief discussion of the kinds of cases he adjudicated 
helps to remind us of the work federal judges have done and do. 
A. Admiralty 
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was a major reason 
for the creation of the federal district courts in 1789.5 After 
  
 4 See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE 
PEOPLE: THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW 
YORK 1965-1990, at 34 (1992). 
 5 Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. See, e.g., JEFFREY B. MORRIS, 
FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 7 (1987). 
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Congress established the Eastern District of New York in 1865, 
the New York ports brought interesting and important 
questions arising out of collisions, groundings, and sinking of 
vessels, as well as suits brought by sailors and longshoremen 
for wages and physical injuries, to the federal courts. 
While admiralty and maritime cases have declined in 
number—mirroring the decline of water shipping more 
generally—cases involving vessels, sailors, and longshoremen 
are still found in the work of the district courts.6 In spite of 
resemblances to the laws of torts and workers’ compensation, 
admiralty and maritime law evoke a world and vocabulary of 
their own. Judge Trager was no stranger to the lingo: 
The vessel contained four cargo holds (or hatches) with each hatch 
containing two levels—a tweendeck (upper cargo storage area) and a 
lower hold. . . .  
Attached to the fore and front walls of each hold is a ladder leading 
up from the tweendeck to the main deck. About one meter to the left 
or the right of the tweendeck ladder, in the floor of the tweendeck, is 
an access door (or escape hatch). The access door cover can be lifted 
up by hand and opens toward the wall where it can be fastened to 
the wall to keep the access door open . . . .7 
Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act, a comprehensive federal workers’ 
compensation program, “[the] injured longshoreman is entitled 
to . . . benefits regardless of fault,” but “[t]he injured 
longshoreman’s employer,” usually an “independent 
stevedore . . . is shielded from any further liability.”8 But if the 
injury was caused by the negligence of a vessel, the 
longshoreman can sue the vessel’s owner.9  
Trager was quite sympathetic to seamen. In McMillan 
v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard,10 Judge Trager considered the law of 
maintenance and cure11 when a seaman claimed injury to his 
  
 6 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 7, 19. 
 7 Fernandez v. China Ocean Shipping (Grp.) Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 369, 371 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 8  Conenna v. Loyal Chartering Corp., No. CV 98-7402, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1545, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2003) (quoting Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 
S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 96 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9 Id. at *10-11 (citation omitted). 
 10 885 F. Supp. 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 11 Dating back to at least the twelfth century, the law of maintenance and cure 
makes the ship owner responsible for paying maintenance and cure following any injury 
or sickness incurred by a seaman while in the owner’s employ, whatever the cause.  
 
184 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
back caused by lifting a shackle and line on the tug. As a 
result, the plaintiff missed some work. The defendant claimed 
that McMillan had an undisclosed, pre-existing back injury. 
His prior medical history also indicated neck and shoulder 
injuries and a history of valium use to control muscle spasms. 
Furthermore, rumor circulated that McMillan sought 
replacement on an upcoming fourteen-day hitch. When that 
request was turned down, McMillan said something equivalent 
to, “One way or another I am getting off the boat.”12  
Yet, employing a Court of Appeals decision favorable to 
the seaman plaintiff,13 Trager held that McMillan had a good-faith 
basis for withholding the information because McMillan missed 
only five days of work in 1976 and did not regularly use valium 
for his back injury.14 At worst, Trager wrote, McMillan’s belief was 
“an honest failure to reveal a prior medical condition.”15 Trager 
also indicated in a footnote that “it would be reaching to conclude 
from [McMillan’s] statement that some months earlier he had 
fraudulently concealed his pre-existing medical conditions.”16  
In the end, all doubts were resolved in favor of the 
seaman. As a result, Trager held that the defendant had 
terminated McMillan’s maintenance and cure too early. Even 
though McMillan stayed, rent-free, with family and friends 
during his recuperation, Trager did not deduct from McMillan’s 
judgment any savings or earnings accrued while off work (for 
McMillan had no other way of supporting himself).17 Trager 
held, “[A] shipowner cannot escape its liability for maintenance 
by forcing an injured seaman to involuntarily seek the financial 
support of family and friends during his or her convalescence.”18 
But Trager did not award punitive damages and attorneys’ fees 
because the owner’s conduct was neither callous nor 
  
“Maintenance” is the sum of money sufficient to provide food and lodging for 
the injured seaman during his or her convalescence and until he or she 
reaches the point of maximum medical cure. . . . “Cure” consists of payments 
for all aspects of the seaman’s medical care until he or she reaches maximum 
medical cure. 
Id. at 459 (citations omitted). 
 12 Id. at 456. 
 13 Sammon v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp., 442 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 14  McMillan v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 15 Id. at 461. 
 16 Id. at 461 n.11. 
 17 Id. at 465-66. 
 18 Id. at 465. 
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recalcitrant.19 The owner had made an erroneous decision, but 
one that had a “good faith basis.”20 
B. Bankruptcy 
The federal courts’ involvement in bankruptcies dates 
back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 198421 
established the bankruptcy court as a unit of the district court; 
accordingly, the district court refers bankruptcy cases and 
proceedings to the bankruptcy court. 
Trager handled a number of bankruptcy matters. In 
one, he gave short shrift to the debtor’s filing because the 
debtor failed to abide by the bankruptcy court’s repeated 
orders—first, to make adequate post-petition mortgage 
payments, and second, to comply with rental obligations. Also, 
the debtor could not propose a satisfactory repayment plan.22 In 
another case, Trager held against non-lawyer, fly-by-night 
bankruptcy preparers who engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law and violated the bankruptcy law provision 
prohibiting fraudulent, unfair, or defective acts.23 
C. Criminal Cases 
Considering Trager’s distinguished career as a U.S. 
Attorney, it could have been anticipated that he would make a 
mark as a judge in the field of criminal law. There was no 
question of Trager’s interest, ability, and comfort in the field. 
In turn, his opinions made the factual implications and legal 
stakes of each case clear. To reach these decisions, Trager used 
his ability to discern the tactics and strategies of attorneys.24 
Like his colleagues, Judge Trager heard many habeas 
corpus petitions from state prisoners. Generally, he denied these 
petitions with relatively brief opinions. Although usually cloaked 
  
 19 Id. at 466-67, 469. 
 20 Id. at 467. 
 21 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).  
 22 In re Watkins, Civ.A. No. CV-05-4271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44754 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005); see also In re Watkins, 362 B.R. 568, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 23 See In re Tomlinson, 343 B.R. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 110(h)(5)(i)(1) (2006).  
 24 Trager did not have many organized crime and political corruption cases as 
a judge. But see Russo v. United States, No. 04-CV-3871, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62209 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007). 
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in a theory of ineffectiveness of counsel, the issues varied in 
habeas petitions brought before him. Judge Trager considered 
petitions concerning whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the essential elements of a conviction;25 whether a line-
up was too suggestive;26 and whether a petitioner’s challenge 
rested on procedural or substantive grounds.27 
Trager’s ability to study a criminal case, determine its 
strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of both sides, 
and foresee and assess the tactics of the attorneys allowed him to 
decide more authoritatively than most judges. Vaknin v. United 
States28 is an excellent example. Vaknin was an action to vacate a 
sentence and conviction.29 The case dealt with a complex criminal 
scheme that involved obtaining commissions from a wireless 
carrier through the sale of customer information.30 The defendants 
used the information to fraudulently renew customer contracts 
and buy and sell wireless phones. Vaknin sought reversal because 
the government failed to disclose evidence favorable to the 
defendant under Brady v. Maryland31—specifically, that Vaknin 
was not aware of the sale of customer information.32 In assessing 
the motion to vacate defendant Vaknin’s sentence, Trager ruled 
that the government’s failure to disclose was not reversible error 
because the information would have simply confirmed what 
Vaknin already knew.33 Then, in dealing with the ineffectiveness 
of counsel claim, Trager demonstrated that there was no 
reasonable probability of Vaknin’s case proceeding to trial: no 
competent counsel would have pursued that theory even if 
Vaknin’s acquittal had been a possibility.34 
Trager’s effectiveness in handling facts is also evinced 
in an opinion he penned when he sat by designation on the 
  
 25 Loving v. People, No. CV-04-1284, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45026 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2007). 
 26 Brinson v. Annetts, No. CV-05-5582, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76388 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008). 
 27 Mateo v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, No. CV-04-3420, 2007 WL 2362205 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007). Similar to the state habeas petitions, and usually brought pro 
se, were 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions to alter federal sentences. Birkett v. United States, 
No. CV-97-1526, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34785 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2008). 
 28 No. 08-CV-02420, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86254 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010). 
 29  Id. at *1. 
 30  Id. at *5-9. 
 31 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 32  Vaknin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86254, at *41-42. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Even if this theory proved successful, the defendant’s sentence would not 
have been mitigated. See id. at *53-54. 
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Eleventh Circuit.35 The defendant, Richardson, had been 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine.36 He argued that the evidence presented at trial had 
not proved a single overarching conspiracy but rather the 
existence of multiple distinct conspiracies for which he had not 
been charged.37 Writing for a panel, Trager lucidly and 
compellingly marshaled the evidence against Richardson, 
demolishing the theories raised by his defense. Richardson 
was, Trager wrote, “a ‘key man’ [who] direct[ed] and 
coordinate[d] the activities and individual efforts of various 
combinations of people.”38 Richardson “was not a spoke, but the 
hub of all the conspiratorial acts the government sought to 
prove at trial.”39 Judge Trager’s language is telling: this was not 
the kind of case where the government sought to convict a 
defendant who played a peripheral role in a vast conspiracy. 
Thus, the court, affirming the conviction, held that the 
government presented evidence sufficient to establish the 
common goal, underlying scheme, and overlap of participants.40 
The evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that each co-
conspirator worked with Richardson according to Richardson’s 
grand scheme. Trager’s ability to work with doctrine in 
criminal cases was also on display in Rivera v. Artus, a habeas 
case. In two footnotes, Judge Trager analyzed two lines of court 
of appeals decisions involving the suppression of statements 
made to police concerning both an unrepresented and a 
represented matter in the course of the same interrogation.41 
Trager also wrote several interesting opinions in criminal 
cases for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United 
States v. Paopao,42 for instance, posed the issue of a protective 
sweep. A police detective received a tip from a confidential 
informant that several suspected robbers of illegal gambling 
rooms were in a particular room in Honolulu.43 Arriving at the 
site and making an arrest, the officers performed a protective 
  
 35 United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc 
denied, 285 F. App’x 745 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 36  Id. at 1282. 
 37  Id. 
 38 Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 39 Id. at 1288.  
 40  Id. at 1285-86. 
 41 No. CV-04-5050, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79345 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2007). 
 42 469 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 43  Id. at 763. 
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sweep that took less than a minute.44 As the officers were leaving 
the apartment, one of them noticed an unzipped bag.45 Looking 
into the bag, one of the officers saw what he thought was the 
handle of a handgun and ammunition.46 He seized the bag, and 
the contents were later determined to be a gun, ammunition, a 
knife, and a black pouch of jewels.47  
Writing for the court, Trager held that the defendant, 
Paopao, personally had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the game room and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the 
protective sweep.48 Indeed, if the judge ruled that Paopao had 
standing, the search would still have been held valid because 
the police had reasonable suspicion from the informant’s tip.49 
While Paopao could contest the seizure of his bag, the search of 
an object in plain view is constitutional. 
In another Ninth Circuit criminal case for which Trager 
wrote the opinion, the panel affirmed the conviction of a thirty-
five-year-old man who had attempted to persuade and entice a 
minor—an undercover FBI agent in an online chat room—to 
engage in sexual acts.50 The court held that the trial court had 
acted within its discretion in admitting evidence tending to 
prove the defendant’s intent and modus operandi.51 Specifically, 
the trial court allowed evidence of the defendant’s previous 
conviction for lewdness with two children, aged eleven and 
twelve, as well as evidence of complaints of similar behavior that 
had been made to America Online.52 Judge Trager held that its 
prejudicial impact was outweighed by its probative value.53  
  
 44  Id. 
 45  Id.  
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. at 764-65. 
 49  Id. at 765-67. 
 50  United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 51  Id. at 1157. 
 52  Id. at 1156. 
 53 Id. at 1159. However, the distinguished philosopher-judge John Noonan 
disagreed with the sentence of almost twenty-four years in prison, which the court 
affirmed. The panel affirmed the sentence, finding that the trial judge had made no 
significant procedural error. In response to Judge Noonan’s criticism, the panel opined 
on the district court’s reasonableness “to conclude that a lengthy prison sentence was 
necessary to protect the public.” Id. at 1160. Further, the panel held that the trial 
judge “was not required to consider the much more lenient sentences available for 
other violent and arguably more heinous sex offenses.” Id. at 1161. Judge Noonan 
argued that the defendant’s crime was “committed by words in the imaginary world of 
the chat room.” Id. at 1162. In words reminiscent of Trager’s colleague Jack B. 
Weinstein, see, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), 
Noonan wrote: “The defendant is not a convenient abstraction such as ‘a pedophile’ but 
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D. Pro Se Cases 
There are few federal judges who enjoy litigation brought 
pro se. There is no evidence that David Trager was such a judge. 
However, in only a few cases did he show exasperation.54 One 
such case seems to have begun when the pro se plaintiff 
allegedly forced his way into a sixteen-year-old tenant’s home, 
which he owned.55 He was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he 
and his wife then filed a complaint, which was subsequently 
withdrawn. An amended complaint was then filed naming the 
original defendants—a state judge, Kings County District 
Attorney Charles Hynes, and two assistant district attorneys—
along with the New York City Department of Corrections, Rent 
Guidelines Board, and Police Department, as well as the 
Criminal Court of Kings County and five other governmental 
offices.56 The plaintiff, George Pappanikolaou, alleged a 
conspiracy to convict him by tampering with the evidence.57 He 
also alleged abuse and discrimination claims against the Police 
Department, Department of Corrections, and the Rent 
Guidelines Board.58 Other deprivations were alleged in the 
thirty-one page complaint, which Trager described as “a lengthy 
narrative which rambled about conspiracy theories.”59 
Judge Jack Weinstein, among the most tolerant judges 
in dealing with pro se litigants,60 had dismissed the complaint.61 
  
a human being who cannot be so summarily categorized. It may take the sentencing 
judge effort and empathy to address the person before him. The judge has no choice if 
he is to follow the law.” Cherer, 513 F.3d at 1162. 
 54 One such case was brought by a homeless New Yorker who sought five 
hundred million dollars as well as other relief, though that was expressed incoherently. 
Belton v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-2937, 2005 WL 2133593 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 
2005). The plaintiff was suing for five hundred million dollars because, he claimed, the 
New York City Transit Police at the Clark Street subway station (near to the main 
courthouse of the Eastern District) had “failed to keepsake his belongings” when he 
was arrested. Id. at *1. The five hundred million dollars of missing possessions was for 
an emergency crisis kit, one fifty dollar special comforter, and two twin size blankets. 
Id. at *2. Trager construed the complaint as a section 1983 action for deprivation of 
property without due process of law, but dismissed it because of the lack of any official 
police policy or custom. He did, though, point the plaintiff to state law causes of action 
for negligence, replevin, and conversion. Id. at *3. 
 55  Pappanikolaou v. New York City, No. CV-01-865, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39201, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2005). 
 56  Id. at *3. 
 57  Id. at *3-4. 
 58  Id.  
 59 Id. at *4. 
 60 See, e.g., JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE 
CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 24, 61-62 (2011). 
 61  Pappanikolaou, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39201, at *5-6. 
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But the Second Circuit reversed to the extent that there were 
claims against the New York City defendants for deliberate 
indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs and that there were 
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.62 Weinstein 
then recused himself from the case, but the plaintiff’s extensive 
litigation continued. 
After a conference before a magistrate judge, 
Pappanikolaou filed a 118-page complaint which dealt largely 
with his arrest, incarceration, and prosecution, although the 
Second Circuit and the magistrate judge had already indicated 
that these issues were off limits.63 The plaintiff then filed a 
third complaint, described by Judge Trager as “a fifty-nine 
page, single-spaced document that was yet again filled with the 
same rambling and incomprehensible allegations that were 
present in the first two amended complaints.”64 This was 
followed by the fifth status conference, which, in turn, was 
followed by an order containing explicit instructions concerning 
how the complaint should be properly amended.65 Consequently, 
the plaintiff filed his fourth complaint.66 It was forty-three pages 
long and named numerous new defendants (among them, the 
New York Governor George E. Pataki, State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer and Chief Judge Judith Kaye).67 Despite the 
magistrate’s instructions, the plaintiff continued to allege that 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had already 
dismissed the case. Trager said that the new complaint 
“nonsensically ramble[d].”68 When the City and State moved to 
dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a 229-page opposition.69  
Yet, even after all this, Trager was unwilling to dismiss the 
case for failure to comply with a court order or for failure to comply 
with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
10(b).70 Trager did, however, dismiss for failure to comply with 
Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” of claims requirement. The 
plaintiff had otherwise failed to state a valid claim for relief under 
section 1983, the Civil Rights statute, or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. The dismissal was without leave to amend. 
  
 62  Id. at *6-7. 
 63  Id. at *7. 
 64 Id. at *8. 
 65  Id.  
 66  Id. at *10. 
 67  Id. at *10, *12 n.2. 
 68 Id. at *22. 
 69 Id. at *13 & n.3. 
 70 Id. at *15-17, *26-28. 
2011] DAVID TRAGER: JURIST 191 
There was also the action brought by Israel Valle, who, 
in 2004, Trager enjoined from filing any new action “seeking in 
forma pauperis status without obtaining leave of court.”71 Valle 
sought leave to file five actions in 2002, two in 2006, nine in 
2008, and four in 2009.72 In 2010, Valle filed three more actions 
alleging in the first two that numerous state court judges were 
involved in a criminal enterprise.73 In the third action, he sued 
district judges, a U.S. magistrate judge, the clerk of the court, 
and various other court personnel.74 Judge Trager, one of the 
named defendants, noted that—as in prior attempts—he would 
not recuse himself, “as there [was] no basis to do so and it would 
only [have] provide[d] Valle with another person to sue should 
[the] case [have been] reassigned to another district judge.”75 He 
added: “In essence, Valle has formulated a template that he 
repackages with a different caption depending on which court 
has dismissed his latest attempts to file frivolous litigation.”76 As 
an order to show cause for sanctions was pending, Judge Trager 
simply denied leave to file the three actions and certified that 
any appeal of his order would not be in good faith.77  
Trager had a special connection to another pro se case, 
Leeds v. Meltz.78 In Leeds, the plaintiff was an attorney, an 
alumnus of the City University of New York School of Law.79 
Leeds sued the acting dean of CUNY School of Law and three 
student editors of the school’s student newspaper because the 
newspaper had refused to publish a classified advertisement in 
which Leeds sought material to discredit faculty and 
administrators for a civil rights action against the school.80 Leeds 
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had 
been violated by the editors’ refusal to publish the ad; the 
plaintiff argued that the student editors were acting under color 
of state law and were thus violating his constitutional rights.81 
Trager had no doubt that the student editors were not 
state actors. And in fact, Leeds’s argument—reliant upon an 
  
 71 In re Valle, No. MC-10-0033, 2010 WL 364355 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010). 
 72  Id. at *1. 
 73  Id. 
 74 Id.  
 75  Id. 
 76 Id.  
 77  Id. at *2. 
 78 898 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 79  Id. at 147. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Id. at 147-48. 
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inference that the editors’ decision was influenced by the public 
school’s administration—was undermined by Leeds’s own 
complaint, which alleged that “the administration retaliated 
against the paper by cutting its budget and access to facilities.”82 
The fact that a publication is sponsored by a state agency, by 
itself, is insufficient to establish state action.83 The newspaper at 
issue was sufficiently independent, and its actions could not be 
characterized as state action.84 Indeed, Leeds had “alleged no facts 
from which it could plausibly be inferred that the editors’ actions 
were ‘fairly attributable’ to the law school administration.”85 
Former Dean Trager pointed out that it was “difficult to 
believe that all three student editors would have supinely 
accepted the alleged intimidation of the school 
administration.”86 “[S]tudents being students, more than likely 
they would have at least complained to some of their student 
colleagues about the administration or faculty pressure and the 
issue, in the natural course of events, would inevitably have 
become a subject of student discussion at the law school.”87 
The Leeds opinion also rested on a broad principle: “As 
most student publications are generally without substantial 
resources, baseless actions can impair the First Amendment 
rights of the publications and their student participants.”88 
Further, if complaints could be sustained “on the flimsy basis 
present here,” students “would be unwilling to run the risk of 
having to pay substantial legal fees to defend themselves from 
unjustified legal actions and would forego the opportunity to 
participate in this activity.”89 
  
 82 Id. at 148.  
 83 Id. at 148-49. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 149 (citations omitted). 
 86  Id. at 150. 
 87 Id.  
 88  Id. at 149. 
 89 Id. at 149-50. In Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational & 
Educational Services, Trager dealt with a lawsuit brought by a Brooklyn Law School 
graduate, a quadriplegic suing pro se a New York State agency which provides services 
to those with disabilities (VESID). 683 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
602 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2010). The relationship between Wasser and VESID had “been 
contentious from the start.” Id. at 204. VESID had reimbursed Wasser for part of his 
legal education at Brooklyn Law School, but only up to the cost he would have had if he 
had gone to CUNY Law School, which was much less than at Brooklyn. Id. at 219. 
Wasser argued that the one law school sponsored by the state, the State University of 
New York at Buffalo Law School, and CUNY were inappropriate for him because of his 
disability and his career goals. Id. at 220. Wasser had actually begun law school while 
Trager was still dean and he cited the “receptive atmosphere” at Brooklyn Law School. 
Trager ruled against Wasser on this claim (indeed, on all his claims). Id. at 220, 225. 
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E. Trager’s Decisions While Sitting with Courts of Appeal 
The custom of designating district judges to sit with 
courts of appeal for short periods of time not only acclimatizes 
district judges to the different concerns of appellate judges, but 
it allows district judges the luxury to focus on more specific 
issues of law than they would normally be allowed.90 David 
Trager sat by designation on the Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Appellate work was an 
important part of his legacy.91 
Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd.92 was an Eleventh 
Circuit case which raised difficult conflict-of-law issues. 
Following settlement of a ship captain’s maritime tort action 
for injuries he sustained as a result of an alleged defective ship 
food lift, a number of parties filed third-party complaints 
seeking to receive indemnity and contribution from the ship’s 
builder and designer and from an associated U.S. venture.93 The 
ship, the Meduse, was built in the Netherlands and registered 
in the Cayman Islands.94 The shipbuilder and ship designer 
principally operated in the Netherlands, but conducted 
business in the U.S in a joint venture. The ship’s purchaser 
was a business entity organized under the laws of the British 
Virgin Islands, and the captain was employed by a British 
Virgin Islands corporation. The ship’s management company 
(Vulcan Manager) and crew were incorporated in the State of 
  
He stated that Wasser had not shown that Brooklyn Law School “offered supportive 
services that were unavailable at a public law school.” Id. at 220. He stated that 
“Wasser’s belief that CUNY School of Law was academically inferior does not require 
VESID to waive its otherwise valid policy. CUNY School of Law is located in 
reasonable proximity to his home. It was fully accredited . . . . Graduates of CUNY are 
employed in a wide variety of settings . . . .” Id. While it was “within Wasser’s 
discretion to choose to attend a private law school, it was also appropriate for VESID to 
reimburse tuition rates only up to the cost of a public institution.” Id. 
 90 For many years Congress provided that, where the constitutionality of 
federal statutes was at issue (and when certain other issues were involved), there was 
to be review by a three-judge district court constituted by the Chief Judge of the 
Circuit. The three-judge courts were usually made up of two district judges and one 
court of appeals judge. Gradually, that jurisdiction has been eliminated. See Act of 
February 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823; Elliot S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, The 
Applicability of Three-Judge Federal Courts in Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal 
Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 417, 429 (1972). 
 91  Several of Judge Trager’s circuit court of appeals’ opinions are discussed 
elsewhere in this essay. 
 92 575 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 93  Id. at 1157. 
 94  Id. at 1158-59. 
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Washington.95 The entity that constructed the yacht allegedly 
operated in the United States. 
The district judge had dismissed the third-party 
plaintiffs’ claims using the Dutch Statute of Repose.96 As 
interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit, however, the case had two 
sets of issues raising distinct choice-of-law concerns over the 
third-party claims: one set of issues concerned a Dutch choice-
of-law clause and Dutch limitation-of-liability provision; the 
second set of issues involved whether Dutch law, federal 
maritime law, or a third jurisdiction’s law governed the third-
party claims. In his opinion, Trager indicated that the district 
court had been hampered by limited information about Dutch 
law and was completely uninformed as to the laws of the 
Cayman and British Virgin Islands. 
This is not the place to trace the contours of Trager’s 
twenty-nine page opinion, which deals with, at least as 
calculated by this author, eleven issues and subissues. The 
opinion applies three different sets of law in different places: 
Dutch law, federal maritime law, and Florida law. The district 
judge, who apparently had not considered all the aspects of this 
complex puzzle, was affirmed in part and reversed in part.97 
Trager’s opinion on the choice-of-law and conflict-of-laws issues 
suggests not only how comfortable he was in this arcane area, 
but also how much he enjoyed it.98  
Trager also wrote for the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in an interesting civil rights suit, Young Apartments, 
Inc. v. Town of Jupiter.99 The case involved section 1983 and 
breach-of-contract claims brought by the owner of an 
apartment complex.100 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, 
a town and town official, had harassed and discriminated 
against him and other Hispanics by refusing to provide them 
affordable housing.101 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the 
  
 95  Id. at 1159. 
 96  Id. at 1161. 
 97 Id. at 1180.  
 98  Trager handled an unusual number of conflict-of-laws and forum non 
conveniens issues. See, e.g., Giaguaro v. Amiglio, 257 F. Supp. 2d 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(a complicated dispute over the sale of Italian canned, peeled tomatoes); see also 
Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2010) (where Trager wrote the opinion for the 
Second Circuit in a case involving a civil suit brought by a Yale student who claimed 
she was sexually assaulted in her dormitory room by another Yale student after a Yale 
sponsored back-to-school event). 
 99 529 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 100  Id. at 1032. 
 101  Id.  
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town had adopted an overcrowding ordinance in response to the 
increasing number of immigrant workers.102 The ordinance was 
purportedly enforced through “excessive and selective” housing 
inspections that targeted landlords housing Hispanics.103 The town 
inspected the plaintiff’s apartment complex and cited it for 
violations of the ordinance as well as physical defects on the 
property.104 The town condemned some units in the building which 
led to the cancellation of the contract to sell the building.105 
The district court dismissed most of Young’s complaint. 
The appeal centered on the holding that Young lacked standing 
to bring a race-based discrimination suit as well as the 
dismissal of the complaint against two town officials. The court 
of appeals reversed on the standing issue because Young 
Apartments had suffered financial injuries.106 That is, “Young 
could allege that it was injured by Jupiter’s discriminatory 
actions regardless of whether such claims might also vindicate 
the rights of its immigrant tenants.”107 Nor was Young barred 
by prudential principles of third-party standing from 
advocating on behalf of its customers against discriminatory 
actions that interfered with a business relationship. Indeed, 
“Young Apartments [was] uniquely positioned to assert claims 
on behalf of its Hispanic residents.”108 The court of appeals also 
reversed as to the proper level of review. The trial judge had 
used a rational basis test. However, “because Young 
Apartments [had] standing to attack the ordinance as racially 
discriminatory,” the proper test was strict scrutiny.109 The trial 
judge was affirmed in part and the case was remanded. 
A third opinion Trager penned for the Eleventh Circuit 
also deserves mention. In Hanley v. Roy, Judge Trager 
encountered the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction.110 Grandparents from Ireland, 
the Hanleys—who had been named testamentary guardians of 
their daughter’s children—argued that their son-in-law (Roy) 
had wrongfully removed their grandchildren to Florida.111 The 
  
 102  Id. at 1033. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 1035. 
 105  Id.  
 106 Id. at 1038-39. 
 107 Id. at 1040. 
 108 Id. at 1044. 
 109 Id. 
 110 485 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 111  Id. at 643. 
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district court dismissed the petition.112 The court of appeals, 
with Trager writing, reversed. 
After their then-divorced daughter had been diagnosed 
with cancer, the Hanleys bought her a house in Ireland and 
moved in to help care for her children; Roy also moved into the 
house.113 Before her death, the daughter named her parents the 
testamentary guardians of the children.114 Roy and the children 
continued to live with the Hanleys for four-and-one-half years 
after the children’s mother died. Then he “suddenly moved the 
children from Ireland to Florida without the Hanley’s 
knowledge or consent, leaving only a note behind.”115 
The court of appeals held that under Irish law, 
“testamentary guardians” must act jointly with the father as 
guardians. If the father objects, the testamentary guardians 
are entitled to “seek a court determination enforcing their 
joint-guardianship rights.”116 The district court held that the 
status of testamentary guardians was not enough to accord the 
Hanley’s “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention and 
under the interpretation of the Convention by Irish courts.117 
The grandparents were therefore entitled to seek a court 
determination enforcing their joint guardianship rights. The 
court of appeals then struck at the heart of the case: 
“[P]ermitting the very act which the Convention seeks to 
prevent—namely, flight—to constitute a construction to 
terminate the Hanley’s ‘rights of custody’ would make a 
mockery of the Convention.”118 The court of appeals directly 
ordered Roy to return the minor children to Ireland for proper 
proceedings, and, if he did not do so promptly, the district court 
was to order the minor children turned over to the Hanleys.119 
Judge Trager’s opinions while sitting by designation on the 
courts of appeals suggest that he would have been comfortable 
and well qualified to sit fulltime as an appellate judge. 
  
 112  Id. at 644. 
 113  Id. at 643. 
 114  Id. at 644. 
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 645-46.  
 117 Id. at 646.  
 118 Id. at 650. 
 119  Id. 
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II. AREAS OF LAW WHERE JUDGE TRAGER MADE SPECIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
As judge, David Trager made significant contributions 
in two classic specialties of the federal courts—antitrust and 
copyright. He also handled two cases of broad interest—one 
relating to the events of September 11, 2001, the other an 
unusual criminal case involving terrorism, which deserves 
separate treatment. 
A. Antitrust 
Trager handled two important antitrust cases—one case 
involving the widely used antibiotic Cipro and another against 
Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C. In the Cipro litigation, 
Trager supported the longstanding position of the pharmaceutical 
industry that settlement of suits between generic and branded 
pharmaceutical companies is not presumptively anticompetitive. 
At issue was a patent holder’s reverse payment to generic-drug 
manufacturers to avoid a patent challenge.120 
In Cipro, Barr Laboratories and the Rugby Group 
challenged as anticompetitive agreements between Bayer AG, 
its American subsidiary, Bayer Corporation (the brand 
manufacturer of Cipro), and a group of generic manufacturers. 
Barr argued that the agreements, which were lawsuit 
settlements, violated antitrust law under the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Act).121 In 1991, Barr filed a certification for generic 
Cipro claiming Bayer’s patent was invalid. In response, Bayer 
sued for infringement. The suit stayed approval of generic 
Cipro by the Food and Drug Administration for thirty months. 
Bayer and Barr ultimately settled their dispute to avert a 
costly trial. Under the settlement, Barr and Rugby 
acknowledged the validity of the Cipro patent, and Barr agreed 
to amend its certification so that it could market generic Cipro 
only after Bayer’s patent expired. For its part, Bayer agreed to, 
among other things, license Barr and Rugby to market a 
competing ciprofloxacin product six months before the Bayer 
  
 120 See In re Tamoxifen, 277 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 121 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)). 
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patent’s expiration.122 The agreement spawned multiple 
putative class actions in various state courts that were 
removed to federal court. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation transferred those cases to Trager, who remanded 
some of them back to state courts and retained others with 
institutional plaintiffs.123 
On May 20, 2003, Trager ruled that the Cipro 
settlement did not violate the antitrust laws. He noted that the 
challenged settlements resolved the entire patent dispute 
without creating a “bottle neck” for subsequent generics. The 
real question for antitrust purposes was whether the 
settlement would hinder lawful competition.124 Trager stressed 
that the American legal process encourages the settlement of 
lawsuits. A contrary rule might lead, he said, to less 
investment in research and development. He therefore denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.  
In 2005, Trager rendered judgment for the defendants 
on similar grounds.125 He held that it would be “inappropriate 
for an antitrust court, in determining the reasonableness of a 
patent settlement agreement to conduct an after-the-fact 
inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent. Such an 
inquiry would undermine any certainty for patent litigants 
seeking to settle their disputes.”126 Thus, Trager held, the 
settlement had not violated the antitrust laws because the 
settlement excluded no competition beyond the exclusionary 
scope of the patent. The appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was transferred to the Federal Circuit, which in 
2008 affirmed Trager’s position.127  
The second of the antitrust cases possessed significant 
international implications. The Vitamin C antitrust action was 
  
 122 Pamela J. Auerbach & Christopher M. Grengs, Recent District Court Rulings 
Support Brand-Name Drugmakers, Generic Counterparts, 1 PHARM. L. & INDUST. REP. 666 
(2003), available at http://bna.com/piln/display/batch_print_display.adp. 
 123 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 
756-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 124 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 125 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 126 Id. at 530. 
 127 In re Ciprofloxacin Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
The Second Circuit also backed Trager, although the panel invited the appellants to 
petition for rehearing en banc. The full court proved not to be interested. Ark. 
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc 
denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011). 
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notable because the Chinese government presented its views as 
an amicus.128 The multidistrict litigation consisted of separate 
class action suits brought by American individuals and entities 
that had purchased Vitamin C from Chinese manufacturers. 
The plaintiffs alleged that Chinese companies had met with the 
Association of Importer and Exporters of Medicines and Health 
Products of China and formed a cartel.129 As a result, the 
Chinese market share on Vitamin C increased and the price 
nearly tripled.130 Plaintiffs further alleged that the Chinese 
manufacturers met in June 2004 and agreed to raise prices by 
shutting down production and restricting exports to the United 
States.131 The Chinese defendants argued that comity and the 
act-of-state doctrine (a foreign government may not be 
questioned in another nation’s courts for actions within its 
borders) applied.132 Indeed, the AIEMC was associated with the 
Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and Health Products 
Importers and Exporters, an entity under the direct control of 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.133  
In June 2006, the Chinese manufacturers sought a stay of 
discovery pending their motions to dismiss. They argued that they 
were going to secure a dismissal on a theory akin to the act-of-
state doctrine—that they could not be held liable for conduct in 
violation of U.S. antitrust laws because the Chinese government 
had compelled them to engage in their conduct.134 The Chinese 
government then filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that the 
Chinese manufacturers were compelled under Chinese law to 
collectively set a price for vitamin exports. Trager responded: 
“The Chinese government’s appearance as amicus curiae is 
unprecedented. It has never before come to the United States as 
amicus to present its views. This fact alone demonstrates the 
importance the Chinese government places on this case.”135 
Nevertheless, Trager reasoned that the documents the 
Chinese submitted as attachments to their brief, if credited, 
would present a complex interplay between the Chinese 
government and the defendants, where defendants’ independence 
  
 128  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 129  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 130  Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 548-49. 
 131  Id. at 549. 
 132  Id. at 550. 
 133  Id. at 551. 
 134 Magistrate Judge James Orenstein denied the application to stay 
discovery. Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 35. 
 135 Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 552. 
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in making pricing decisions was difficult to determine at that 
stage in the litigation.136 
But in November 2008, Trager rejected the claim by the 
Chinese companies to dismiss the case on the grounds that their 
price-fixing activities were compelled by the Chinese government. 
He held that the record was too ambiguous to foreclose further 
inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants’ actions. While the 
Ministry brief was entitled to “substantial deference,” it would not 
be taken as conclusive evidence of compulsion.137  
B. Copyright 
Trager wrote a number of interesting opinions in the 
area of copyright law. One was Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/Interactive Corp.138 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether registration of a 
copyright takes place when the Copyright Office receives a 
completed registration application or only after the Copyright 
Office issues a certificate of registration. Four courts of appeals 
and several district courts had considered the issue and were 
divided equally.139 In addition, there was a recent Supreme 
Court decision bearing on the issue.140 
The Ninth Circuit panel found no guidance from the 
language of the relevant clause in the statute or the law as a 
whole.141 However, looking at the purpose of the law, the panel 
concluded that the application approach better fulfilled 
Congress’s purpose to provide broad copyright protection and 
maintain a “robust federal register.”142 The Ninth Circuit thus 
sided with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in holding that 
receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application 
satisfies the registration requirement.143 
  
 136 Id. at 556.  
 137 Id. at 557. After Judge Trager’s death, the case was reassigned to Judge 
Brian Cogan. 
 138 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 139 Id. at 615 n.4. 
 140 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 141 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617-18. 
 142  Id. at 618. 
 143 Id. at 616, 621. One fine Trager opinion written for the Eleventh Circuit on 
the question as to whether the Copyright Act accords a magazine a privilege to produce 
a digital compilation containing exact images was vacated by an en banc court, 
although the latter court reached the same result. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 
488 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 497 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d 
en banc, 553 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). At issue was whether the National Geographic 
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C. Extraordinary Rendition 
One Trager decision that aroused considerable criticism 
involved the extraordinary rendition of a Canadian citizen who 
passed through John F. Kennedy Airport while attempting to 
catch a connecting flight to Canada.144 Maher Arar, on his way 
home from vacationing in Tunisia, was intercepted by American 
officials who believed he was a terrorist.145 Detained, Arar was 
interrogated, placed in solitary confinement, and given the 
opportunity to voluntarily return to Syria (which he refused).146 
Arar was permitted only a single meeting with counsel, and was 
then branded “clearly and unequivocally a member of al Qaeda,” 
flown to Jordan, and turned over to Syrian authorities.147 Neither 
the Canadian Consulate nor Arar’s attorney was informed before 
he was taken from the United States.148 
During his ten-month detention in Syria, Arar was 
tortured149 (as Arar warned American officials he would be150). 
He was forced to sign a confession stating that he had 
participated in terrorist training in Afghanistan, which he later 
denied.151 His statements were apparently shared with the 
United States government. Ultimately, Syria released Arar, 
who returned to Canada.152 Later, Arar—a telecommunications 
engineer who held both Syrian and Canadian citizenship—was 
completely exonerated by the government of Canada. Seven 
  
Society could release an unedited CD-ROM collection of its back issues without paying 
photographers royalties for their work. Trager’s panel and the en banc court held that 
the addition of new material to the work—an introductory sequence—did not take the 
revised collective work outside the privilege, for other portions were privileged (the 
reproduced issues of the magazines themselves (“Replica”) and the computer program 
(“program”)).  
  Trager also handled a large number of copyright-infringement suits 
brought by record companies throughout the United States in response to online 
distribution. The suits were brought against individuals in an attempt to combat and 
deter what record labels perceived as massive copyright infringement over the 
Internet. See generally UMG Recordings v. Lindor, CV-05-1095, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20952 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Torres, No. CV-07-640, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92774 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Lindor, 531 F. Supp. 2d 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); UMG Recordings v. Lindor, No. CV-05-
1095, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83486 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006).  
 144  Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 145  Id. at 253. 
 146  Id.  
 147  Id. at 254. 
 148 Id. at 252-54.  
 149  Id. at 254. 
 150 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 586 (2d Cir. 2009) (dissenting opinion).  
 151  Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
 152  Id.  
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months after Trager’s decision on rendition (February 2006), 
the Canadian government concluded that Canadian 
intelligence, under pressure to find terrorists, had passed on 
false warnings about Arar to the United States.153 The 822-page 
report of the commission established by the Canadian 
government found that Arar had no involvement in Islamic 
extremism and was not a security risk.154 The Prime Minister of 
Canada sent a letter of apology to Arar and his family along 
with payment of approximately $9.75 million.155 In June 2008, 
the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security 
told a congressional committee that he would not rule out that 
U.S. officials had violated U.S. laws.156 
In the meantime, Arar brought suit seeking declaratory 
relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Having been 
removed to Syria under the covert U.S. policy of “extraordinary 
rendition,” through which non-U.S. citizens were “sent to 
foreign countries to undergo methods of interrogation not 
permitted in the United States,”157 Arar alleged that the U.S. 
officials had violated (1) the Torture Victim Prevention Act 
(TVPA); (2) his Fifth Amendment rights when the defendants 
knowingly subjected him to torture and coercive interrogation 
in Syria; (3) his Fifth Amendment rights through his arbitrary 
and indefinite detention in Syria, including denial of access to 
counsel, the courts, and his consulate; and (4) his Fifth 
Amendment Rights because he had suffered “outrageous, 
excessive, cruel, inhumane and degrading conditions of 
confinement in the United States where he had been subjected 
to coercive and involuntary custodial interrogation and 
deprived of access to lawyers and courts.”158 
In the course of a lengthy opinion that resolved many 
(but not the most important) issues in a manner favorable to the 
plaintiff, Trager awarded no relief. He first held that Arar 
lacked standing for declaratory relief because the activity he was 
challenging was neither ongoing nor likely to impact him in the 
  
 153 Apparently Arar had acquaintances in Canada who were being investigated. 
Id. at 256 n.1. 
 154 The United States refused to cooperate with the Canadian inquiry. 
 155  Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 156 Louis Fischer, Extraordinary Rendition, The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1405, 1441-42 (2008); John R. Crook, Second Circuit Panel Dismisses Canadian 
Citizen’s Claims Involving Removal to Syria: Court to Rehear en Banc; U.S. Agencies 
Investigate Handling of the Case, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 880, 882 (2008). 
 157 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 256. 
 158 Id. at 257-58. 
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future.159 Then, after making a series of rulings for Arar 
regarding the application of the TVPA, Trager held that because 
Congress intended for the Act to be used as a remedy for U.S. 
citizens subject to torture overseas, it did not apply in Arar’s 
case.160 
With respect to compensatory and punitive damages, 
the claim for relief was based on the so-called Bivens remedy, 
one created by the Supreme Court for federal officials’ 
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.161 
Once again, Trager resolved the preliminary questions 
favorably to Arar but refused to extend Bivens to overseas 
conduct because of Congress’s power over aliens and the 
“national security and foreign policy decisions at the heart of 
this case.”162 Extending Bivens in this sort of case, wrote Trager, 
“could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches 
to respond to foreign situations involving our national 
interest.”163 Further, Trager believed that most if not all judges 
lacked the experience or the background “to adequately and 
competently define and adjudge the rights of an individual vis-
à-vis the needs of officials acting to defend the sovereign 
interests of the United States.”164 The task of balancing 
individual rights against national security concerns was one, 
he felt, courts should not take on without the guidance or 
authority of the coordinate branches.165 The claim that Arar was 
deprived of due process rights during his period of domestic 
detention still might, Trager wrote, potentially raise Bivens 
claims, but Arar would have to redraft a complaint excluding 
the rendition claim and naming the defendants that were 
personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment. 
That Arar never did.166 
Trager’s opinion in Arar was subjected to considerable 
criticism. He may have escaped some obloquy had he resolved 
  
 159 Id. at 258-59. 
 160  Id. at 263. 
 161 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
 162 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.  
 163 Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990)). 
 164 Id. at 282. 
 165 Trager denied Arar’s claim of denial of access to counsel and he dismissed 
all claims against the individuals without prejudice to repleading Count 4. Id. at 286. 
 166 The United States had moved for summary judgment in the Arar case, 
invoking the state-secrets privilege. Having held for the government on the statutory and 
constitutional claims, Trager found the issue involving state secrets moot. Id. at 287. 
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the case on the basis of the state-secret doctrine, but he 
possibly did some good in resolving so many subissues 
favorably to Arar. The federal judiciary as a whole did not 
cover itself with glory in litigation involving 9/11. This author 
wonders about the claim that executive officials, often with 
very little experience in dealing with national security matters, 
are more up to the task of balancing individual rights against 
the claims of national security than experienced judges. 
Barbara Olshansky, Deputy Legal Director of the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, has put it this way: “There can be little 
doubt that every official of the United States [involved in Arar’s 
torture] knew that sending him to Syria was a clear violation of 
the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and international 
law . . . . This is a dark day indeed.”167 A ruling for Arar would 
have flown in the face of most of the 9/11 cases and perhaps 
such a step would not have been appropriate for a district 
judge. At least Trager’s rulings for Arar on the subissues might 
have operated as a brake on the executive.  
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed Trager’s decision over one dissent.168 Without either 
party requesting it, the Second Circuit vacated the panel 
opinion, and then, sitting en banc affirmed Trager by a vote of 
seven to four.169 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Dennis 
Jacobs affirmed Trager as to standing. He dispatched Arar’s 
claim under the TVPA more easily than Trager, however. 
Judge Jacobs held that to state a claim under the TVPA, there 
must be an allegation that U.S. officials possess power under 
foreign law and the offending actions must derive from an 
exercise of that power.170 On the Bivens claim, the court also 
affirmed. While not precluding judicial review and oversight, it 
held that if there was to be a civil remedy in damages suffered 
in the context of extraordinary rendition, Congress would need 
to create such a remedy.171 The Supreme Court denied 
  
 167 Nat Hentoff, The Torture Judge, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.C.) (Mar. 7, 2006), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2006-03-07/news/the-torture-judge; see also Jules Lobel, 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 
479 (2008). Lobel was counsel to Arar. See Michael V. Sage, The Exploration of Legal 
Loopholes in the Name of National Security: A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition, 
37 CAL. INT’L L.J. 121, 132, 135 (2006). 
 168 Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 169 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
 170 Id. at 568. 
 171 Id. at 576. In his dissent, Judge Robert A. Sack found the majority’s 
recitation of the facts as “generally accurate, but anodyne.” He then stated that “[t]he 
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certiorari.172 The treatment of the Arar case by all three tiers of 
the federal judiciary was of a piece with the approach of all 
three branches of the U.S. government to refuse to be held 
accountable for torture after 9/11. 
D. United States v. Nelson 
The most publicized decision of Judge Trager’s career 
was connected to boiling racial tensions in his home borough, 
Brooklyn. On August 19, 1991, an automobile driven by a 
Hasidic Jew struck two black children in Brooklyn’s Crown 
Heights; one of the children was killed.173 Rumors swiftly spread 
that the ambulance driver at the scene had treated the Hasid 
ahead of the children.174 A riot occurred. Eleven African-
Americans—including a defendant, Lemrick Nelson Jr.—
chased Yankel Rosenbaum, an orthodox Jew, and stabbed him 
to death.175 Nelson, then sixteen, was found with a bloody knife 
and was positively identified by the victim before he died.176 
Nelson and Charles Price, who had harangued the crowd, were 
charged with second-degree murder and acquitted in state 
court.177 Bitter feelings between the Jewish and African-
American communities festered. 
Nelson moved to Georgia where he got into more 
trouble.178 He pleaded guilty, as an adult, to aggravated assault 
and carrying a concealed weapon.179 The U.S. Attorney for the 
  
district court’s opinion carefully and fully sets forth Arar’s allegations.” Id. at 582, 584 
(Sack, J., dissenting). 
  Judge Trager also had before him a rather different case involving 
terrorism. This was a suit brought by a family who were dual citizens of the United 
States and Israel, who sued a Swiss financial institution with offices in the United 
States and Israel over the death of their husband/father who was killed in Israel in a 
bus blown up by terrorists. The plaintiffs claimed that the bank (UBS AG) had 
provided financial services for the alleged terrorist organization, Hamas. In September 
2009, Judge Charles P. Sifton dealt with issues of standing, forum non conveniens, and 
motions to dismiss. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). After 
Sifton’s death in November 2009, the case was assigned to Trager who denied motions 
for reconsideration of the forum non conveniens issue and to certify Sifton’s order for 
interlocutory appeal. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 172 Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
 173  United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636, 637 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 174  Id. at 637-38. 
 175  Id. at 638. 
 176  Id.  
 177  Id.  
 178  Id. at 640. 
 179  United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 90 F.3d 
636 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Eastern District of New York charged Nelson, then nineteen, 
with juvenile delinquency over Rosenbaum’s death. Five days 
after the information was filed, the government moved to 
transfer Nelson to criminally prosecute him as an adult for 
violation of Rosenbaum’s civil rights. Trager denied the order 
but was reversed by the Second Circuit. The appellate court 
held that Trager had improperly evaluated the strength of the 
government’s evidence and erred by not considering Nelson’s 
age at the time of the transfer (minimizing the seriousness of 
the offense), by using a “glimmer-of-hope” test to determine the 
possibility of Nelson’s rehabilitation, and by not making any 
inquiry into juvenile programs available for someone of 
Nelson’s age.180 The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded to 
Trager for further findings and reconsideration. 
Before the hearing on remand, Nelson had been charged 
with resisting arrest and criminal trespass. The latter had 
occurred when he refused to leave the federal courthouse. In 
his opinion on remand, Trager granted the motion to transfer 
because of the seriousness of the crime charged as well as the 
finding that “it [was] not ‘likely’ that Nelson would be 
rehabilitated.”181 This time the decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals.182 Trager wanted to avoid turning the Nelson 
trial into a proceeding as racially divisive as Rodney King’s had 
been in Los Angeles. He intended to empanel “a moral jury that 
render[ed] a verdict that ha[d] moral integrity.”183 However, an 
important Supreme Court decision, Batson v. Kentucky,184 stood 
in his way. Batson held that peremptory strikes on the basis of 
race violate the Equal Protection Clause.185 That case and its 
progeny were primarily aimed at lawyers, but presumably 
bound judges as well. 
Presiding over jury selection in the Nelson case, Trager 
denied the defendant’s for-cause challenge of a Jewish juror 
(Juror 108) who had doubted his ability to be objective.186 Then, 
when an African-American juror was excused, the Judge did 
not replace the juror with the first alternate juror but rather 
  
 180 United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 181  Nelson, 921 F. Supp. at 122. 
 182 Id.  
 183 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting trial 
transcript). 
 184 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 185  Id.  
 186  Nelson, 277 F.3d at 172. 
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sua sponte removed a second white juror from the panel and 
filled the two spaces with an African-American juror and Juror 
108.187 The resulting jury, which included three African-
Americans and two Jews, convicted both men. Trager 
sentenced Nelson to 235 months and Price to 262 months.188 
On appeal, much of Judge Guido Calabrisi’s lengthy 
opinion revolved around the application of the Civil Rights Act 
to the Nelson case. But in dealing with Trager’s race- and 
religion-based shuffling, the court held that Juror 108 had been 
improperly seated because he had revealed sufficient bias 
during the voir dire.189 Further, the consent given to his 
selection by the attorneys was invalid because it was obtained 
in exchange for the improper empanelling of a jury chosen 
partly on the basis of race.190 Even though the defendants had 
improperly consented to the scheme,  
where the trier of fact in a criminal trial is a biased jury that 
resulted from a district court’s erroneous failure to grant a for-cause 
challenge to an actually biased juror whose bias was revealed at the 
voir dire, we question whether a defendant can subsequently waive 
his claim . . . to be tried before an impartial fact finder.191  
Even though “the motives behind the district court’s race- and 
religion-based jury selection procedures were undoubtedly 
meant to be tolerant and inclusive . . . that fact cannot justify 
the district court’s race-conscious actions.”192 
Dissenting in part, Judge Chester J. Straub, though 
troubled about the jury selection, would have affirmed, but 
noted the court’s willingness to vacate such efforts in the 
future. As for the Nelson case, Straub said, “When one 
considers the overall circumstances and conditions of this trial, 
we can have overwhelming confidence in the fairness and 
validity of its verdict.”193  
Thus, Trager was reprimanded for an “activist” solution 
intended to avoid divisiveness and reach a “moral” result. 
  
 187 Id.  
 188  Id. at 173. 
 189  Id. at 203-04. 
 190 Id. at 208, 210. 
 191 Id. at 206. 
 192 Id. at 207. 
 193 Id. at 217, 220. Eight years after the appeal in the Nelson case, Trager filed 
an opinion explaining why he had not recused himself from the case. United States v. 
Nelson, No. CR-94-823, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63814 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010). 
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III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASES 
A. Section 1983 and More Modern Statutory Civil Rights 
Cases 
While Trager was not a notable enthusiast for 
workplace-based claims under sections 1981194 and 1983,195 
plaintiffs did not fare too badly in cases before him.196 Trager 
granted summary judgment against British Airways in a Title 
VII action. The plaintiff, Elizabeth de Chanval Pellier, claimed 
that after she was promoted to duty-maintenance manager (a 
middle-level management position) at John F. Kennedy 
Airport, other employees engaged in inappropriate sexual 
conduct, including the posting of pornographic material 
directed specifically at Pellier.197 Because the airline did not 
effectively respond to her complaints, Pellier ultimately had to 
accept a position with fewer material responsibilities in order 
to escape the intolerable conditions. 
Trager found that Pellier’s transfer was not an “adverse 
employment action because she [had] voluntarily requested 
and accepted it.”198 However, he did find that Pellier had a 
triable claim of hostile work environment.199 British Airways 
argued that Pellier had engaged in conduct similar to that of 
which she was complaining: “over-exuberant hugging and 
kissing,” sexually explicit conversations, and—during her work 
history at the airlines—“intimate relations” with two British 
Airways employees (one of whom she later became engaged 
to).200 Yet, the judge found the consensual relations 
“irrelevant.”201 “Even if . . . Pellier was comfortable with certain 
  
 194 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) (protecting the rights of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States to, among other things, make and enforce contracts 
and entitling them to the full and equal benefit of laws for the security of persons and 
properties as enjoyed by white citizens).  
 195 Id. § 1983 (providing the remedy for deprivation of federal constitutional 
and statutory rights when violated under color of state law).  
 196  On the other hand, see Barney v. Consolidated Edison Co., No. CV-99-823, 
2009 WL 6551494 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009), where Judge Trager granted summary 
judgment against a former Consolidated Edison employee who sued under Title VII 
and section 1981; see also Vinson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. CY-01-6900, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3943 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006). 
 197 Pellier v. British Airways, PLC, No. Civ.A. 02-CV-4195, 2006 WL 132073, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006). 
 198  Id. at *4. 
 199 Id. at *15. 
 200  Id. at *7. 
 201 Id.  
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sexual behavior in the workplace, a reasonable jury need not 
conclude that she was thereby comfortable . . . [with] being 
singled out by an all-male staff as the lone target of sexually 
explicit materials.”202 He later granted summary judgment to the 
defendant for the sex-discrimination claim, but denied it as to the 
retaliation and hostile-environment claims. Trager evidenced no 
lack of sympathy for the defendant in this situation. 
Trager also held for the plaintiff in a case involving the 
New York City Transit Authority. For promotion to the position 
of subway station supervisor, the authority required an EKG 
test if the candidate had a problematic medical history and was 
over forty.203 The plaintiff challenged the policy under the Age 
and Discrimination in Employment Act. Trager refused to 
accept the defendant’s bona fide occupational-qualification 
defense. As he wrote, practically and with wit, 
To put the question sharply, what exactly would happen if a Station 
Supervisor, Level I were to suffer an unexpected heart attack? While 
such an event would unquestionably be more than a small 
inconvenience to the individual himself . . . there is no indication in 
this record that a great danger would befall either the TA’s 
operations or the general public.204 
In another case, Trager clearly was greatly disturbed by 
the narrative of Lawrence Hardy’s section 1983 suit.205 Hardy, 
an ex-convict who had served a four-year sentence for robbery, 
was arrested for violating parole. He then sued under section 
1983. The heart of the section 1983 action, discussed by Trager 
in thirty-four pages of the Federal Supplement, was the New 
York City Department of Corrections’ deliberate indifference to 
Hardy’s very serious ear infection. 
As Trager told the story, Hardy’s ear infection had been 
causing him pain and dizziness prior to his arrest. The 
defendants’ gross negligence magnified the symptoms, and a 
golf-ball-sized swelling grew from Hardy’s neck.206 From there, 
the symptoms developed into extreme pain, blurred vision, 
  
 202 Id. at *8 (citation omitted). 
 203  Epter v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 127 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
After winning the lawsuit and getting the transit authority to change its policy, Epter 
was promoted to station supervisor, but then asked to be returned to his old position. 
Judge Trager awarded back pay damages and attorneys’ fees to Epter but held that 
liquidated damages were not appropriate. Epter v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 216 F. Supp. 
2d 131, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 204 Epter, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92. 
 205 Hardy v. City of New York, 732 F. Supp. 2d 112, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 206  Id. at 118. 
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discharge from the ear, and hearing loss.207 Within eight weeks, 
Hardy had difficulty walking and standing as the swelling in 
his neck grew to the size of a tennis ball with pus emanating 
from his ear in a constant flow.208 Only then was Hardy seen by 
a specialist and a mastoidectomy performed.209 The operation 
was but a partial success as a staph infection developed.210 A 
little more than two months after the operation, Hardy was 
released from custody and admitted immediately to Manhattan 
Eye and Ear Hospital.211 Diagnosed with a life-threatening 
infection, Hardy survived but ended up in a nursing home 
where he eventually lost hearing in one ear.212 
Trager dismissed Hardy’s action against the New York 
State defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds and 
dismissed claims of deliberate indifference against some of the 
officers.213 However, Trager preserved claims against some of 
the defendants at the Downstate Correctional Center, as well 
as a nurse, a physician, and correction officers at the Willard 
Drug Treatment Center.214 
B. Social Security Disability Appeals 
By the time David Trager ascended to the bench, the 
“war” the federal judiciary had fought with the Social Security 
Administration was over. Under political pressure, bureaucrats 
and administrative law judges had in the 1980s denied large 
numbers of applicants’ benefits and had thrown many recipients 
of benefits off the payroll. Federal judges of all judicial 
persuasions had been remanding cases to the agency.215 The 
battle had waned by the time Trager was appointed. Judge 
Trager generally upheld agency determinations without 
publication of opinions. There was, however, one case where he 
granted judgment on the pleadings and awarded ten years of 
disability retroactively. 
  
 207  Id. at 119. 
 208  Id. at 120. 
 209  Id. at 122. 
 210  Id. at 123. 
 211  Id. at 124. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. at 127-28. 
 214  Id. at 145-46. 
 215 See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, ESTABLISHING JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA 271-
72 (2007); MORRIS, supra note 60, at 188-89. 
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Irene Rooney was denied benefits for her disabilities 
three times.216 Fifty-nine years old, she had been a reliable 
employee for thirty-three years but suffered from progressive 
asthmatic disorder, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
bronchitis, and arrhythmia.217 She was also in considerable pain 
due to degenerative disc disease and chronic spinal strain. She 
was also blind in one eye.218 
In 1987, Rooney filed an application for disability 
benefits.219 Denied benefits initially and on reconsideration, she 
received a notice from the Department of Health and Human 
Services informing her that she had sixty days to request a 
hearing if she believed that the determination was incorrect.220 
The notice stated that if she did not request a hearing she 
could still file another application at any time.221 Nothing in the 
notice informed her that not requesting a hearing would mean 
permanent loss of her opportunity to claim substantial benefits 
up to the time of the new claim. There was nothing giving her 
notice of the consequences of electing not to have a hearing.  
From 1987 until 1991, Rooney, unaware that 
reapplication was not the same as requesting a hearing, filed 
two applications—both denied.222 However, by 1991, the agency’s 
notice of reconsideration had changed and warned about the 
adverse effect of failing to appeal.223 Proceeding with counsel, she 
finally requested a hearing during which she sought to open the 
previous denials.224 When the administrative law judge refused to 
pursue the issue, Rooney appealed to the district court.225 
Even though the decision not to reopen an adjudicated 
claim is generally not reviewable by the courts, Trager found a 
violation of procedural due process. Writing that the record was 
“somewhat muddied,”226 Trager stated that the notice Rooney 
had been given was “almost deliberately crafted to divert the 
lay person from a timely appeal.”227 The record in Rooney’s case, 
  
 216 Rooney v. Shalala, 879 F. Supp. 252, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 217  Id.  
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Id. at 255. 
 221  Id. 
 222  Id.  
 223  Id.  
 224  Id.  
 225  Id.  
 226 Id. at 257. 
 227 Id. at 256. 
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Trager wrote, was “a testament to inattention and disregard.”228 
Rather than remand the case, Trager sympathized with 
Rooney, “a fifty-year old woman with a litany of impairments 
who had worked hard all her life.” He went on to describe the 
record as devoid of “malingering” and with a “remarkable 
number of procedural and evidentiary errors.”229 In turn, Judge 
Trager directly awarded ten years of disability benefits to her 
without a remand.230 
C. Immigration, Deportation, and Extradition Matters 
Judge Trager held for the government in most of the 
immigration, deportation, and extradition matters before him.231 
One case, though, is worth brief scrutiny partly because of its 
lengthy, thorough opinion holding that an indictment for 
illegally entering the country was unlawful because the 
underlying deportation had been unlawful.232 The case is worth 
further scrutiny because of what this observer reads as a 
particular sympathy for the defendant. 
Richard Garcia-Jurado, a Colombian, had come to the 
United States as a legal permanent resident to join his mother, 
who was then a legal permanent resident and later became a 
U.S. citizen.233 Garcia-Jurado’s family in the U.S. included his 
brother and sister, stepfather, and half-sister (who were U.S. 
citizens), and his brother and older sister who were legal 
permanent residents.234 Further, he had a long-tem relationship 
with a legal permanent resident with whom he had a 
daughter.235 In 1993, Garcia-Jurado pleaded guilty to possession 
  
 228 Id. at 261. 
 229 Id. at 258, 261-62. 
 230 Id. at 262.  
 231 See, e.g., Guang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. CV-02-5916, 
2005 WL 465436 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2005) (rejecting habeas corpus petition attempting 
to block removal to China where rejection of asylum claim was correct); Echendu v. 
United States, No. CV-02-1255, 3003 WL 21653370, at *1, *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2003) 
(denying writ of coram nobis to prospective deportee who alleged ineffectiveness of 
counsel where he was convicted of knowingly failing to appear in court in a case where 
he was acquitted); Lo Duca v. United States, No. CV-95-713, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21155 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 1995) (upholding legality of extradition order by Magistrate 
Judge; extradition request and supporting documentation timely; questions of 
sufficiency of extradition documents both beyond the scope of review of petition for 
habeas corpus, but also sufficient on the merits).  
 232 United States v. Garcia-Jurado, 281 F. Supp. 2d 498, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 233  Id. at 500. 
 234 Id.  
 235  Id. 
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of a controlled substance.236 For that, he was sentenced to four to 
twelve years in prison—which he used to complete his GED and 
earn two vocational training certificates.237 At his deportation 
hearing, Garcia-Jurado indicated that he would seek 
discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Law.238 However, the immigration judge 
inaccurately told him that he was not entitled to seek a 
discretionary waiver of deportation.239 Somehow—and Judge 
Trager ignored this part of the story—Garcia-Jurado returned to 
the United States four years later and was arrested for criminal 
possession of marijuana.240 Charged with illegally reentering the 
United States after deportation, an aggravated felony, the 
defendant came before Judge Trager.241  
Trager’s reading of the facts led him to the position that 
Garcia-Jurado had been deported before his administrative 
proceedings had ended and “before the deadline for judicial review 
had passed.”242 After considerable effort, Trager found that the 
immigration judge’s error in failing to provide Garcia-Jurado with 
a section 212(c) hearing “was a procedural error that rendered the 
[previous] proceedings fundamentally unfair.”243 The loss of a 
212(c) hearing supported a collateral attack.244 That, in turn, led to 
Trager’s holding, “Because Garcia-Jurado was deprived of [his 
right to] judicial review . . . his deportation was fundamentally 
unfair.”245 Trager concluded the opinion with what could be viewed 
as a letter of recommendation: 
Garcia-Jurado claims that he would have been a good candidate for a 
§ 212(c) waiver of deportation. Indeed, he would. Garcia-Jurado had 
lived here since he was a teenager. He has strong family ties in this 
country: a mother, stepfather and two half-sisters who are United 
States citizens. He also has two other siblings who are legal 
permanent residents, and, importantly, a daughter who is a citizen. 
He attended high school here, was employed for a year prior to his 
arrest. He also received a GED and vocational training in prison, 
  
 236  Id. 
 237  Id.  
 238  Id. at 501. 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. 
 241  Id. 
 242 Id. at 506-07.  
 243  Id. at 512. 
 244 Id. (citation omitted). 
 245 Id. at 514. 
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and was employed as a machine operator after his release from 
prison up to the time he was deported.246 
D. Dean v. United States 
In the case of Dean v. United States, Judge Trager found 
a clear injustice and ordered the government to correct an 
arrest record—an unusual remedy.247 The case involved the 
arrest of a school-bus driver for public lewdness in a national 
park.248 Dean had been arrested, read his Miranda rights, 
photographed, and fingerprinted.249 Dean alleged that, at the 
time of his arrest, one of the officers at the police station had 
advised him not to involve an attorney. Rather, if he just paid 
the fine, the officer stated, “the incident would fall off [his] 
record in a few years.”250 Dean had promptly mailed in the form 
he was given and paid the eighty-dollar fine.251 
Twelve years later Dean’s arrest showed up in a 
background check for renewal of his commercial driver’s 
license.252 The payment of the fine was treated as a guilty plea. 
As a result, under state law, Dean was unable to continue his 
employment as a school-bus driver.253 
Dean attempted first to have his fingerprints record 
expunged on the ground that his criminal record had made it 
difficult for him to secure employment. Trager held that “such 
relief [could] not be granted under the circumstances.”254 Dean 
tried using habeas corpus to achieve the same end. Trager 
treated the petition as one for coram nobis, a challenge to 
invalidate convictions after the sentence has been served, and 
appeared ready to grant that writ.255 Instead, though, he 
directed the government to, within thirty days, produce the 
form upon which Dean allegedly pleaded guilty.256 
  
 246 Id. at 515. 
 247 418 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 248  Id. at 151. 
 249  Dean v. United States, No. 05-CV-1496, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40903, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005). 
 250  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 251  Id. at *2. 
 252  Id.  
 253  Id. 
 254 Dean v. United States, No. 04-MC-299, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30062, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2004). 
 255  Dean, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40903, at *4. 
 256 Id. 
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The government was unable to locate the document but, 
attempting to comply with the order, submitted the “violation 
notice” form used by the U.S. Park Police at the time of Dean’s 
arrest. “The word ‘guilty’ did not appear on the face of [that] 
notice.”257 Trager was troubled because Dean had not in any 
way been informed of the legal consequences he might suffer if 
he paid the fine. Trager held that Dean should have been 
warned of the consequences of his guilty plea—that payment of 
the fine was acceptance of a federal conviction.258 Without that 
warning, Dean could not have knowingly waived his rights.259  
Trager rejected the government’s argument that 
“allowing a litigant to challenge a petty offense conviction” in 
this manner “would potentially call into question every petty 
offense and misdemeanor.”260 “It appears,” Trager wrote, “that 
the government—and perhaps the courts are complicit—wants 
to have the ‘benefit’ of a criminal conviction for a large number 
of petty offenses without the burden of providing appropriate 
procedural protection.”261 Trager made it clear that, if the 
government wanted to treat this sort of collateral forfeiture as 
a criminal penalty, then to satisfy constitutional concerns, “the 
individual must be given clear notice that payment of the fine 
constitutes a guilty plea resulting in a conviction of a petty 
federal offense and be informed of the right to retain counsel.”262 
With regard to the coram nobis petition,263 Trager held 
for the plaintiff even though there was “an extremely stringent 
standard applied to orders to change arrest and conviction 
records.” He granted coram nobis relief, directing the 
government to complete Dean’s record with “a clarification 
reflecting that he was not convicted of a crime.”264  
  
 257 Dean v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 258 Id. at 155-56. 
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. at 156. 
 261 Id.  
 262 Id. at 157. 
 263 Id. at 152. 
 264 Id. at 157. In a later opinion, Trager granted the government the authority to 
depose Dean on whether he had been aware of the conviction so that it could show that 
the petition was not timely. Otherwise he rejected the government’s petition for 
reconsideration. Dean v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). But see 
Grunberg v. Bd. of Educ., No. CV-00-4124, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22424 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
30, 2006). 
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E. Funding for the Profoundly Disabled and Medically 
Fragile 
David Trager was no “wooly headed dreamer.” 
Throughout his career, Trager sought solutions that were 
practical and just. That was, perhaps, why he pursued the 
course he did in the Lemrick Nelson case. But Judge Trager’s 
passion was closest to the surface in a litigation he handled over 
the residential placement of seriously disabled young adults. 
To some, this litigation was just a lawsuit that 
attempted to pry money from the overburdened fiscs of the 
State and its cities and counties. New York incurred a large 
financial burden from treating and housing the severely 
disabled; residential placements were absolutely necessary for 
them. When no satisfactory placements existed within the 
state, out-of-state placements had to be made, and New York 
split expenses with its cities and counties.265 Federal funds had 
eased the financial burden, but individuals were not eligible for 
funding after the age of twenty one.266  
In 1992, arrangements were made wherein New York 
agreed to share 50 percent of the expense of out-of-state 
placement until suitable in-state institutions were located.267 In 
1994, New York enacted a statute that increased state payments 
to localities and scheduled the phase-out of out-of-state 
placements and the out-of-state recompensation provision.  
In 1994, New York City pulled out of the arrangements 
because of budgetary pressure. During the first half of 1995, 
the State attempted to place recipients of Transitional Care 
Funding (TCF) in state facilities with some success. In 
February of that year, lawsuits were brought by parents and 
guardians of TCF recipients to prohibit New York City and 
New York State from terminating transitional care. The suits 
were unsuccessful.268 Then, over the Fourth of July weekend, 
the State attempted to transfer some of the deeply disturbed 
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individuals without the permission, or even notification, of 
their parents/guardians.269 The result was somewhat of a fiasco.  
A federal action was brought by eighteen of the disabled 
young adults, and eight others sought to intervene.270 They were 
asking for a preliminary injunction requiring the state to take 
all necessary steps to maintain the placements until an orderly 
transition to permanent, state-approved placements was 
accomplished. 
As is often the case with judicial opinions, the manner 
in which the facts are stated presage the ultimate conclusion of 
law and give a clue to the impact the case has had upon the 
judge. This is the first paragraph of Judge Trager’s opinion in 
Brooks v. Pataki, the first lawsuit involving the funding: “This 
case concerns the care and treatment of about fifty profoundly 
disabled and medically fragile individuals whose rights under 
the federal Constitution have been gravely imperiled as the 
result of an unfortunate funding dispute between the City and 
State of New York.”271 
In the following paragraph, Trager vividly illustrates 
the “victims” in the dispute: 
[O]ne is a twenty-six old woman who has epilepsy and an IQ of about 
70-72 as well as other disabilities. Another is a twenty-five year old, 
profoundly retarded . . . woman. Seven of the eight proposed 
intervenors are profoundly autistic and pose potential danger, 
certainly, to themselves and, possibly to others.272 
Six months later in a different lawsuit over the same issues 
with similar plaintiffs, Trager wrote: 
It is important to understand just how profoundly disabled plaintiffs 
are. TCF recipients are not likely candidates for de-
institutionalization. For instance, plaintiff Lora Hoops, aged twenty-
five, diagnosed as functioning in the profound range of mental 
retardation, with cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder has been at 
The Woods School, in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, since she was 
placed there by a Suffolk County local school district nineteen years 
ago, at the age of six.273 
In the suit involving Westchester County funding, Trager 
quoted from a description of plaintiff Jason Goodhue, age 
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twenty three, who had “a diagnosis of severe mental 
retardation, cerebral palsy, spastic diplegia, functional 
scoliosis, . . . encephalopathy and a seizure disorder. He uses a 
wheel chair which [he] is able to push independently, though 
his control is poor. He is nonverbal, understands simple 
commands and usually responds yes/no verbally to questions.”274 
In considering whether to grant the preliminary 
injunction in the New York City case, Trager focused on claims 
of due process—claims which had not been finally adjudicated 
in the State’s case. Trager found the constitutional standard in 
a Second Circuit decision, Society for Good Will to Retarded 
Children, Inc. v. Cuomo,275 and deemed the State’s procedure 
“manifestly unprofessional.”276 According to Trager, the episode 
on the Fourth of July was “an unconstitutional violation of the 
rights of these individuals that threatened them with 
irreparable harm.”277 Trager offered an analogy to a State’s or 
Congress’s decision to end support for a dialysis program:  
Such a program is not an entitlement; there is no custody of the 
patient for state action purposes; and the program’s elimination is 
within the discretion of a State or Congress. Still, no one would 
seriously argue that the Due Process Clause does not impose an 
obligation upon a State or Congress to provide reasonable notice to 
dialysis recipients before terminating funding for those who have 
relied on that life-sustaining program, so as to allow them the 
opportunity to obtain alternate access to treatment.278 
Trager denied the State’s motion to stay the judgment. In 
that opinion, he made clear that the funding was not an 
entitlement. Rather, once the State undertook to provide 
residential care for individuals, it was obligated to provide 
“necessary safe conditions and freedom from undue restraint 
determined by the exercise of professional judgment.”279 Having 
failed to make appropriate in-state placements, the State could 
not abruptly leave these severely disabled individuals “stranded 
in placements when the City [terminated its] funding.”280 
A few months later, Suffolk County followed New York 
City in withdrawing from the State program. Now Trager had 
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a companion case. In Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. 
Pataki,281 Trager granted a preliminary injunction ordering 
Suffolk County to resume funding for six months “so as to 
provide . . . the opportunity to arrange alternative care in an 
orderly manner.”282 The State indicated it would “reimburse the 
county for sixty percent of the cost” and was ordered to 
“assume the burden of funding any remaining TCF placements 
at the end of the six-month period.”283 Just about one month 
later he denied the County’s request for a stay pending appeal. 
Westchester County then withdrew from the state 
program, providing Trager with a third case.284 The Westchester 
case posed the same issues as the Suffolk case.285 However, the 
Westchester case came down after the U.S. Court of Appeals had 
remanded the New York City case. As will be seen shortly, 
Trager was unable to rest on the Due Process Clause any longer. 
Instead, he based his decision in the Westchester case on the 
Equal Protection Clause, holding that the County had violated 
equal protection by granting protections to persons 
institutionalized in-state that the TCF recipients (out-of-state) 
did not have.286 Trager held that the TCF statute lacked a 
rational basis.287 Trager also held that the State failed to offer 
procedural due process.288 As a result, three weeks after the 
Court of Appeals had vacated Trager’s decision in the New York 
City case, Trager granted the Westchester plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the County defendants. The 
State was ordered to, among other things, continue to pay for 
the out-of-state facilities where plaintiffs were still residing.289 
However, Trager stayed the injunction based upon the stay the 
Court of Appeals had ordered in the Suffolk case.  
However, as has already been intimated, three weeks 
before the first Westchester decision the Court of Appeals, by a 
two to one vote, rained on Trager’s parade. The panel majority 
vacated the injunction in the New York City case and remanded 
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it to Trager.290 The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were barred by res judicata. The court also held that the 
defendants had no duty under the Due Process Clause to 
provide professional care to plaintiffs and no duty to resume 
payments for the plaintiffs’ out-of-state placements.291 The 
Court of Appeals also held that the “July Fourth weekend 
episode amounted to a breach of the State defendants’ duty to 
ensure that the involuntary transfers were constitutionally 
appropriate, but that this injunction [was] not the appropriate 
remedy for this breach.”292 Barrington Parker dissented from 
the Court of Appeals decision. He would not have “disturbed 
Trager’s conclusions that there [were] sufficiently serious 
questions regarding the risk of further abuse of the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process rights, and that the balance of 
hardships tip[ped] decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.”293 
The parties in Brooks v. Pataki reached an agreement 
whereby the State would continue to provide the requested funds 
and the case was administratively closed on May 11, 2000.294  
In the handling of the litigation involving the mentally 
disabled, David Trager sounded and acted more like his 
colleague, Jack B. Weinstein, than one might expect. In a letter 
written while the litigation was still alive, Trager commented, 
“As a non-believer in entitlements, I found myself developing a 
purely procedural due process theory to justify judicial 
intervention in a fact pattern that cried out for relief.”295 
One of the opinions in the Suffolk County case indicated 
how far Judge Trager, no judicial activist by philosophy, traveled 
in the mental health litigation: “The role of the judiciary to review 
executive and legislative actions and to protect the rights of 
persons unable to protect themselves from unconstitutional 
governmental intrusion has long been recognized.”296 
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CONCLUSION 
It is premature to assess a judicial career of seventeen 
years that only ended this year. Much of what a district judge does 
is not found in the judge’s opinions. One would, for example, have 
loved to have been a fly on the wall observing this larger-than-life 
personality conduct settlement negotiations. Unfortunately, there 
is limited coverage of Trager’s work in newspapers. However, the 
potential availability of the oral history Trager created during the 
last year of his life will enrich our knowledge of his work and—
hopefully over time—interviews of his clerks, colleagues, and 
friends will provide a more definitive account of the work of not 
just a very able judge, but a man whose career as a whole stands 
as a model of how a single lawyer can benefit society.  
But some observations of Trager, as judge, may be 
permitted at this time. Although Trager was a strong and 
unforgettable personality, as a judge, he clearly did not seek the 
spotlight. His opinions could be analytically complex, but his 
prose is almost always straightforward. A man, who in person 
could be extraordinarily amusing, rejected wit in judicial opinions.  
Trager’s career certainly demonstrates the breadth of the 
work of contemporary federal judges. Indeed, this author lacked 
the time and space to discuss Trager’s handling of threshold 
matters (standing, ripeness, etc.). Nor did I discuss interesting 
Trager opinions in trademarks, commercial law, torts, and 
attorney dealings. The particular federal specialties that offered 
Trager the richest opportunities were antitrust and copyright. As 
one might have expected, Trager demonstrated marked ability in 
criminal cases both as a district and a court of appeals judge. 
Indeed, Trager penned for three U.S. Courts of Appeals; he would 
have distinguished himself as an appellate judge, had that job 
fallen to him. On the other hand, the district bench offered him 
constant interactions with others, something Trager loved. 
A moderate and careful judge who abjured grandiloquence, 
Trager’s emotions could be deeply engaged by his cases. That 
clearly was true in the mental health cases, the Dean case, and, 
probably, in other cases of injustice, such as befell Irene Rooney 
and Lawrence Hardy. In the case involving Lemrick Nelson, 
Trager was engaged in attempting to achieve in a different way a 
result which would ease rather than raise the simmering tensions 
of a divided city. David Trager was no “bleeding heart,” but he 
cared deeply for the community to which he had devoted his public 
life. And for them, he was a judge who was willing to take risks. 
